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I. INTRODUCTION

For more than eighty years, the estates of wealthy decedents have
been subject to federal estate taxation. At first glance, the estate tax
may appear to play a relatively minor role in the federal tax system.
Compared to the personal income, corporate, or payroll taxes, the
estate tax applies to a very small group of taxpayers and raises little
revenue. Nevertheless, in recent years it has become the focus of
heated controversy and extravagant rhetoric. Opponents have
mounted a sustained campaign to abolish the tax, which they
invariably refer to as the "death tax," portraying it as wasteful,
ineffective, and fundamentally unfair. The anti-tax campaign gathered
momentum in the late 1990s and moved into high gear in 2001 when
George W. Bush was inaugurated as president. In his first major
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domestic policy initiative, President Bush called for massive tax cuts,
including estate tax repeal, which Congress duly enacted in the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (the
2001 Act).'
The 2001 Act provides sizable income and estate tax cuts over a
protracted phase-in period, culminating in 2010 with repeal of the
estate tax and introduction of a modified carryover basis system for
inherited property. These changes are not permanent, however.
Under a special "sunset" provision, the tax cuts are scheduled to
expire automatically at the end of 2010, and prior law will spring back
into force for 2011 and subsequent years.3 Thus, if Congress takes no
further action, the estate tax will disappear in 2010 and then reappear
one year later. This bizarre result reflects a political stalemate
between two competing groups: root-and-branch abolitionists who
insist on complete and permanent repeal, and defenders of the tax
who are willing to consider reform but balk at outright repeal. In 2001
the abolitionists were able to declare victory of a sort, for they
succeeded in putting estate tax repeal on the books, but in the
intervening years they failed to make repeal permanent. It now seems
increasingly likely that the estate tax will survive in some form,
although the details still have to be worked out.
The outlines of a pragmatic compromise involving a larger
exemption and lower rates have been apparent since 2001.4 Why, then,
has it proved so difficult for the opposing factions to reach an
agreement? The protracted controversy can be explained largely as an
exercise in political brinkmanship and anti-tax ideology. The notion of
estate tax repeal may have proyed effective in rallying political
support for the Bush administration's ambitious tax-cutting agenda,
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001).
2 The 2001 Act also calls for repeal of the generation-skipping tax in 2010 but
leaves the gift tax in place. See id. §§ 501 (terminating estate and generation-skipping
taxes after 2009), 541 (terminating death-time basis step-up for property acquired
from a decedent after 2009), 542 (introducing carryover basis for property acquired
from a decedent after 2009).
3 See id. § 901(b) (reinstating prior law for 2011 and subsequent years "as
if [the
2001 Act] had never been enacted").
4 See H.R. REP. No. 107-37, at 194 (2001) ($2,000,000 exemption); H.R.
5008,
107th Cong. (2002) ($3,500,000 exemption and 50 percent top marginal rate). For
more recent proposals along similar lines, see H.R. 4242, 110th Cong. (2007)
($3,500,000 exemption and 47 percent top marginal rate); H.R. 4172, 110th Cong.
(2007) ($3,500,000 exemption); H.R. 3475, 110th Cong. (2007) ($5,000,000
exemption).
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but from a tax policy perspective it is deeply flawed. As a practical
matter, the political stalemate can be resolved only when abolitionists
acknowledge that outright repeal is neither simple nor costless.

II.

RHETORIC OF REPEAL

Estate tax repeal emerged as a mainstream political issue in the
1990s. At the beginning of the decade, outright repeal was still
generally viewed as unattainable, even among business owners,
farmers, and other groups traditionally opposed to the tax.5
Nevertheless, by 1999, repeal had become a politically potent slogan
and an integral part of the conservative anti-tax agenda, thanks to the
efforts of activists who worked tirelessly and single-mindedly to
6
mobilize public opinion against the estate tax. Their aim was not to
inform but to persuade, and their message was simple, clear, and
powerful. They denounced the estate tax as fundamentally "wrong"
and "unfair," portraying it as a penalty on hard work • and7 saving as
well as a threat to ordinary families and small businesses. Endlessly
repeated and amplified in think-tank papers, op-ed pieces, and radio
talk shows, the abolitionists' message eventually became accepted as
an indisputable article of faith in anti-tax circles and as conventional
wisdom among large segments of the general public.'

The estate tax did not figure among the tax cut priorities listed in the
Republican leadership's 1994 "Contract With America." See REPUBLICAN NATIONAL
COMMITTEE, CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 16-19 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds.,
1994) (advocating child tax credit, reduction in marriage tax penalty, tax-favored
individual savings accounts, reduction in capital gains tax rate, and business tax
incentives).
6 For an illuminating account of the campaign for estate tax repeal and the
enactment of the 2001 Act, see MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH By A
THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2005); see also
DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL 71-91 (2003).
7 In the words of one prominent political consultant, the estate tax is the
"wrong tax," comes at the "wrong time," hurts the "wrong people" and helps the
"wrong people." "The Death Tax is simply unfair. It tells every American that no
matter how hard you work or how wisely you manage your affairs, in the end the
federal government is going to step in and take it away. The estate tax... punishes
hard work and savings, it fails to raise the kind of revenues that might conceivably
justify some of the damage it causes. It has been destroying businesses and ruining
lives for four generations .. " GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at 81-82 (quoting
Frank Luntz).
8 For an excellent discussion of the complex interplay between
opinion polls
and perceptions of popular opinion, see id. at 118-30 (noting that opinion polls are
often designed to elicit a desired response and the results are then used "to rally the
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Opponents of the estate tax skillfully designed their message to
shape the terms of the debate, and they succeeded in two important
ways. First, they portrayed the estate tax as a heavy burden for
ordinary families and offered repeal as a simple, attractive solution.
Their account of the estate tax was essentially a caricature that
lampooned the tax's shortcomings and exaggerated its burdens. As
economic analysis, the argument was shallow and tendentious, but as
political rhetoric, it worked effectively to reinforce popular
misperceptions about the estate tax and fuel anti-tax sentiment.9 The
case against the tax was freely embellished with compelling personal
stories that pitted plucky entrepreneurs and their families against
heartless tax collectors. Although some of the stories were semifictionalized, factual accuracy was not important; the purpose of the
stories was to put a human face on the anti-tax message and enhance
its dramatic impact.1° Indeed, the argument against the estate tax
relied more on emotional persuasion than on reasoned analysis. The
abolitionists were not interested in examining alternative theories or
empirical evidence, nor were they concerned about the practical
implications of repeal. Having set out to eliminate the estate tax, they
tailored every facet of their message to point unequivocally toward
repeal.
The second way in which the anti-tax message shaped the debate
lay in its appeal to fairness and morality. The estate tax has long been
viewed by its defenders as promoting equality of opportunity by
curbing concentrations of inherited wealth. In a bold rhetorical move,
the abolitionists seized the moral high ground and denounced the
estate tax as fundamentally unfair. Equating wealth and success with
traditional virtues of hard work, prudent saving, and self-reliance,
they portrayed the estate tax as a penalty on virtue and an enemy of
the "American dream." The abolitionists thus achieved the
remarkable feat of articulating a populist rationale for an antiprogressive tax agenda. More importantly, they shifted the debate

faithful, get media attention, and intimidate potential opposition").
9 Many Americans are "unrealistically optimistic" about their own
economic
circumstances, both in absolute terms and relative to others, and exaggerate their
prospects of becoming rich. Id. at 119; see also id. at 96 ("[Plolls routinely show that
some 20 percent of the American population believe that they are in the top 1 percent,
and another 20 percent believe that they will soon reach that echelon."). Many
Americans also have wildly exaggerated ideas of the proportion of estates subject to
tax. See id. at 125 (noting widespread belief that "most" families have to pay estate
tax).
10 See id. at 50-66 (discussing role of personal stories).
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away from contestable issues of tax policy to the abstract realm of
absolute moral values. By framing the estate tax debate in terms of
fairness, they infused their anti-tax message with a sense of moral
rectitude and signaled that they would settle for nothing less than full
repeal.
III. POLITICS OF REPEAL

By the end of the 1990s the abolitionist message had gained
political traction." Estate tax repeal figured as a prominent issue in
the 2000 presidential campaign, especially after candidate George W.
Bush endorsed repeal as part of his tax-cutting agenda, along with
income tax rate cuts, an expanded child credit, and reduction of the
marriage tax penalty.12 With Bush's inauguration as president, the
prospects of enacting estate tax repeal improved dramatically.
Assimilation into the tax-cutting agenda came at a price, however, for
the Bush administration exercised total control over the terms of its
proposals and demanded unwavering support from its allies. To
coordinate political support for its proposals, the administration
assembled a formidable new coalition which enforced strict discipline
and prevented business groups from pursuing their own separate tax
proposals. 3 As estate tax repeal gained political momentum, it also
became hostage to the administration's much larger and more
ambitious tax-cutting agenda.
The Bush administration formulated its proposals against the
backdrop of a large projected budget surplus, which briefly opened a
window of opportunity to pay down the federal debt, pursue

11 In 1999 and again in 2000 Congress passed estate tax repeal legislation, which
was vetoed both times by President Clinton. See Death Tax Elimination Act of 2000,
H.R. 8, 106th Cong. § 101 (2000); Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, H.R.
2488, 106th Cong. § 601 (1999).
12 The decision to include estate tax repeal was essentially "a
political decision,
not an economic one." GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at 138. Bush's political
advisers recognized the broad appeal of estate tax repeal, but his economic team was
primarily interested in income tax cuts. See id. at 134-39 (discussing Bush's tax
proposals).
13 See id. at 158-65 (discussing Tax Relief Coalition). As
the head of the Tax
Relief Coalition commented, "There is an umbilical cord to the White House....
TRC is not a debating society.... You either support the administration's proposals
and only those changes the administration agrees to, or you leave the team." Id. at
165 (quoting Dirk Van Dongen). Thus, for example, the administration made it clear
that business tax cuts would not be included in the 2001 package and business groups
would have to wait their turn. See id. at 161-62.
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fundamental tax reform, or cut taxes. 14 The Bush administration opted
for massive tax cuts. Although there was bipartisan support in
Congress for some form of tax relief, the size of the administration's
package proved controversial and it became clear that the proposed
tax cuts would have to be scaled back in order to pass the budget
resolution in the Senate. 5 The estate tax cuts came under especially
intense pressure, for many legislators cared less about getting rid of
the estate tax than about delivering broad-based income tax cuts. 16 To
bring the ten-year revenue cost of the 2001 Act within the $1.35
trillion ceiling established in the budget resolution, lawmakers
resorted to various gimmicks including phase-ins, phase-outs, and
sunsets. 7 It had long been clear that estate tax repeal would have to
be phased in over time; the cost of immediate repeal would have been
prohibitively high. To minimize the cost of the estate tax cuts during
the ten-year budget window, the 2001 Act called for gradual cuts in
the top marginal rate and periodic increases in the estate tax
exemption, followed by full repeal and the introduction of carryover
basis in 2010." In a last-minute scramble for revenue, the conference
14 In January 2001 the Congressional Budget Office projected a ten-year budget

surplus of $5.6 trillion (including an off-budget surplus of nearly $2.5 trillion primarily
attributable to Social Security). See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2002-2011, at xiv (2001). By January 2002, the
projected surplus had dwindled to $1.6 trillion. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE
BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2003-2012, at xiii (2002).
15 The budget resolution invoked a reconciliation process which ensured that
the
2001 Act could pass in the Senate with a simple majority of 51 votes (rather than a
supermajority of 60 votes). See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Estate
Tax Repeal and the Budget Process, 104 TAX NOTES 1049, 1052-53 (Sept. 6, 2004);
Michael W. Evans, The Budget Process and the "Sunset" Provision of the 2001 Tax
Law, 99 TAX NOTES 405, 407 (Apr. 21, 2003); Robert Keith & Bill Heniff Jr., The
Budget Reconciliation Process: House and Senate Procedures 1-3 (Cong. Res. Serv.,
Report No. RL33030, 2005).
16 This should not be surprising. Opinion polls reveal far less popular support for
estate tax repeal as an alternative to broad-based income tax cuts than as a standalone issue. See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at 122-23.
17 The budget resolution capped the ten-year cost of the tax
cuts at $1.35 trillion,
the sum of $1.25 trillion - midway between the estimated ten-year cost of President
Bush's original proposals ($1.6 trillion) and the Democrats' counter-offer ($900
billion) - plus $100 billion for retroactive economic stimulus. See id. at 178-79, 18687.
18 See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch,
Estate Tax Repeal: Through
the Looking Glass, 22 VA. TAX REV. 187, 193-94 (2002). The revenue losses from the
estate tax cuts were heavily weighted toward the far end of the ten-year budget
window. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., ESTIMATED
BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1836, at 3 (Joint
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committee added two further gimmicks, accelerating the phase-out of
the state death tax credit and preserving the gift tax as a stand-alone
tax. 9 The ten-year revenue cost of the estate tax cuts under the
conference agreement was less than half the estimated cost under the
Bush administration's proposals.20
The long-term revenue cost of estate tax repeal presented a more
intractable problem. Under the 2001 Act, only one year of repeal was
included within the ten-year budget window, but if repeal were made
permanent, the true cost would rapidly escalate for years outside the
budget window. Although tax cuts could be enacted by a simple
majority vote in both houses of Congress, the so-called Byrd rule
made it virtually impossible to make the tax cuts permanent without a
sixty-vote supermajority in the Senate.21 Under the sunset provision
agreed to in conference, all of the tax cuts would automatically expire
at the end of 2010, thereby avoiding the prospect of a Byrd rule
challenge and ensuring that the tax cuts could be enacted with a
22
simple majority in the Senate. In effect, the sunset provision limited
the scheduled repeal of the estate tax to a single year following a

Comm. Print 2001) (showing more than half of total revenue losses in last two years
of ten-year period).
19 The state death tax credit was phased out and replaced with a new deduction
in 2005. The effect was to shift substantial revenue from the states back to the federal
government. See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at 191, 209-11. The decision to
retain the gift tax as a stand-alone tax in 2010, instead of letting it disappear along
with the estate and generation-skipping taxes, came in response to a memo from the
Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation estimating unexpectedly large
revenue losses due to income tax avoidance opportunities. See id. at 181-82 (noting
prediction of "50 cents or more of lost income taxes for every dollar lost directly from
estate and gift tax repeal").
20

See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE

(2001) (showing
$271.5 billion cost under administration's proposals); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, supra note 18, at 3 (showing $133.2 billion cost under 2001 Act).
21 Under the Byrd rule, any reconciliation legislation that increases deficits
in
ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2002 TAX RELIEF PROPOSALS 59

years beyond the period covered by the budget resolution is subject in the Senate to a
point of order which can be waived only by a three-fifths vote (sixty votes if all
members are present). If the 2001 Act had been introduced outside the reconciliation
process, the bill would have been subject to a filibuster under the Senate's regular
rules, requiring sixty votes for cloture. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 15, at 105253; Evans, supra note 15, at 414; Robert Keith, The Budget Reconciliation Process:
The Senate's "Byrd Rule" 2-7 (Cong. Res. Serv., Report No. RL30862, 2005).
22 The conference agreement passed the Senate by a 58-33 vote, two
votes short
of the number that would have been required to override a Byrd rule challenge.
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protracted phase-out period, and left the issue of permanent repeal
unresolved.
The Bush administration and its allies in Congress almost

certainly could have marshaled the necessary votes to enact
permanent estate tax cuts in 2001, had they been willing to settle for a
compromise package that provided a higher exemption and lower
rates." Instead, they insisted on complete estate tax repeal, no matter

how long delayed, confident that once repeal was on the books they
would be able to make it permanent. In hindsight this appears to have

been a risky gamble, but at the time it may have seemed like a
reasonable strategy. From the outset, the abolitionists viewed estate
tax repeal as a nonnegotiable matter of principle, and in framing their
message they appealed to abstract values of fairness, optimism, and
self-reliance. It was this intransigent stance of moral commitment that
energized the campaign for repeal and at the same time made it
difficult to reach a pragmatic compromise. 21 Similarly, the simple
slogan of estate tax repeal provided a rallying point for members of
the administration's coalition of anti-tax groups. Many business
owners and farmers in the coalition might have preferred immediate
relief in the form of a higher exemption and lower rates, especially
compared to the bizarrely convoluted and evanescent version of
repeal that was ultimately enacted. 2' But there is no indication that
they had any choice in the matter. Indeed, any discussion of
alternatives to complete repeal might have splintered the coalition
and derailed the political momentum behind the administration's tax
23

See H.R. REP. No. 107-37, supra note 4, at 194 (describing proposal by

dissenting committee members to retain estate tax with immediate increase in
exemption to $2 million); H.R. 5008, 107th Cong. (2002) (proposing retention of
estate tax with $3.5 million exemption and 50 percent top marginal rate); see also
William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Should the President's Tax Cuts Be Made
Permanent?, 102 TAX NOTES 1277, 1279 (Mar. 8, 2004) (noting that, within the
reconciliation process, the Bush administration could have sought "a smaller tax cut
within the ten-year budget window in exchange for making the tax cut permanent"
but refused to do so).
24 See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at 261 ("The same moral
commitments
that held the group together made it difficult to compromise.").
25 For a significant number of taxpayers at the lower end of the
spectrum of
taxable estates, an immediate increase in the exemption, together with an unlimited
deathtime basis step-up, would have been objectively preferable to the remote
possibility of repeal coupled with carryover basis. For a few extremely wealthy
families, however, neither an increased exemption nor lower rates would provide
significant benefits compared to complete repeal. For them, maintaining a unified
coalition and pressing for complete repeal may have been a rational strategy. See id.
at 191, 214-17, 258-59.
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Cuts. 2 6

In short, for committed abolitionists, anything short of
complete repeal would have spelled moral weakness and political
defeat.
If the abolitionists expected to follow up on the 2001 Act with a
decisive vote for permanent estate tax repeal, the gamble has not paid
off. Despite repeated attempts since 2001 to make repeal permanent,
they have failed to muster the necessary sixty votes in the Senate. At
the same time, no working majority has coalesced around any realistic
reform proposal. As a result, the 2001 Act has ushered in a period of
instability and uncertainty concerning the future of the estate tax. This
situation offers lawmakers a golden opportunity to solicit
contributions from lobbyists and wealthy constituents seeking to make
estate tax repeal permanent.28 Indeed, Professors Edward McCaffery
and Linda Cohen see this "shakedown" dynamic as the key to the
political standoff over estate tax repeal . 9 They argue that opponents
of the tax could have mobilized at least sixty votes for permanent
repeal in the Senate in 200130 but deliberately chose not to do so in
See id. at 191 (noting that "decision-making in the coalition had become a top
down affair"), 217 (noting that in the run-up to enactment of the 2001 Act "the only
way to sustain the momentum for the tax bill was to put on blinders, ask few
questions, and push for repeal").
27 See, e.g., Death Tax Repeal Permanency Act
of 2007, H.R. 2380, 110th Cong.
(2007); Death Tax Repeal Act of 2007, H.R. 1586, 110th Cong. (2007); Death Tax
Repeal Permanency Act of 2005, S. 420, 109th Cong. (2005); Death Tax Repeal
Permanency Act of 2005, H.R. 8, 109th Cong. (2005); Permanent Death Tax Repeal
Act of 2003, S. 169, 108th Cong. (2003); Death Tax Fairness Act of 2003, S.13, 108th
Cong. (2003); Permanent Death Tax Repeal Act of 2003, H.R. 139, 108th Cong.
(2003); Death Tax Permanency Act of 2003, H.R. 57, 108th Cong. (2003); Death Tax
Repeal Permanency Act of 2003, H.R. 8, 108th Cong. (2003); Permanent Death Tax
Repeal Act of 2002, H.R. 2143, 107th Cong. (2002); Tax Relief Guarantee Act of
2002, H.R. 586, 107th Cong. (2002).
28 See Burke & McCouch, supra note 15, at 1056 ("[B]y deferring
repeal until
the end of an extended phase-in period, the repealers ensure that they can take
advantage of continuing uncertainty and instability to extract contributions from
wealthy political donors."); cf. Johnston, supra note 6, at 78 (noting that delayed
repeal affords "years of opportunities to raise money from donors who could see the
abyss coming and would be eager to speed up the effective date of repeal").
29 See Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci
Gulch: The
New Logic of Collective Action, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1159 (2006).
30 See id. at 1211 ("[A] simple vote-counting.., indicates that
sixty votes were
well within reach."). It is not at all clear, however, that sixty votes could have been
mobilized for repeal. Based on a tally of Senate votes during the period 2000-2003,
McCaffery and Cohen note that there were "more than sixty Senators who had voted
for repeal of the estate tax at one time or another" and also "more than forty
Senators who had voted against repeal of the estate tax at one time or another." Id. at
26
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order to prolong
and extract a continuing stream of
•
•
•the debate
31
campaign contributions.
At one level, the "ex ante rent-extraction model" elaborated by
McCaffery and Cohen represents a plausible extension of standard
public choice theory.32 Indeed, it would be surprising if legislators did
not take advantage of their position to extract favors of one sort or
another from lobbyists. But it is hard to accept their model as the only
(or even the most) plausible explanation for the protracted battle over
estate tax repeal.33 In particular, McCaffery and Cohen downplay the
role of budget rules as part of a complex, often opaque legislative
process. Budget rules may be crude and malleable but they are not
meaningless.3 ' The revenue cost of the tax cuts during the ten-year
1210. From this they infer that "at any point in time, the Senate in the 107th Congress
could have gotten sixty votes for estate tax repeal - or not." Id.
31 See id. at 1165 n.17 ("[T]he Senate, in particular, deliberately strung along the
issue of estate tax repeal, signaling that it had the power to kill the tax without really
doing so, resisting principled compromises along the way, and staging multiple votes
on the issue before resolving it in a way that could have been done ab initio - all in
order to keep alive an issue of value in generating campaign contributions.").
32 For a discussion of the economic theory of regulation and its
application to tax
legislation, see Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of
the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 1 (1990).
33 See McCaffery & Cohen, supra note 29, at 1207-12 (arguing that "there
are no
compelling answers... outside the ex ante rent-extraction model" to explain
Congress's failure to enact permanent estate tax repeal in 2001). Indeed, interestgroup theory predicts that if opponents of the estate tax were able to muster sixty
votes in the Senate for permanent repeal they would have "powerful incentives" to do
so in order to maximize the value of the legislation. See William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J. L. &
ECON. 875, 882, 888-89 (1975) (noting that legislation is much more valuable if all its
benefits flow without future legislative action, and that "the legislature has powerful
incentives to devise methods of increasing the permanency of legislation"). An
equally plausible explanation is that opponents of the estate tax realized they could
not muster the requisite sixty votes in the Senate and accordingly made the best of the
situation by continuing to press for permanent repeal while extracting annual
contributions from lobbyists and interest groups.
The gimmicks in the 2001 Act confirm that lawmakers are adept at exploiting
budget rules for their own ends. See Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Tax
Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 677 (1995) (noting that "opportunistic and
creative legislators" and staff work within and around budget rules to achieve desired
outcomes). Moreover, McCaffery and Cohen note that budget rules are "endogenous,
that is, almost exclusively of legislators' own making, and subject to their change."
McCaffery & Cohen, supra note 29, at 1203 (emphasis in original). It does not follow,
however, that opponents of the estate tax had the opportunity to make repeal
permanent but chose not to do so. Cf id. at 1204 (arguing that lawmakers could have
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budget window was constrained directly by the amount set forth in the
budget resolution and indirectly by the Senate "paygo" rules in effect
in 2001." 5 The extended phase-in of estate tax cuts flowed directly
from the decision to squeeze $1.64 trillion of tax cuts into a $1.35
trillion container, coupled with the relatively low priority of estate tax
repeal compared to broad-based income tax cuts. 36 More importantly,
the Byrd rule effectively prevented the tax cuts from being made
permanent; any extension beyond the ten-year budget window would
have required sixty votes in the Senate. 37 The Byrd rule was designed
to make it difficult to use the fast-track reconciliation process to enact
legislation that would increase long-term budget deficits, 38 and it
altered the budget rules but "chose instead to hide behind the rules, prolonging the
game"). For a discussion of supermajority voting requirements in an analogous
context, see SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE?
FILIBUSTERING IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE 158 (1997) ("The Senate's [filibuster]
rule does affect policy outcomes, frequently at the margins, and sometimes at the
core.") (emphasis in original); id. at 203 ("The filibuster ...has political consequences
for legislative outcomes and strategies.").
35 See supra note 17. The Senate's paygo rule, as it existed in 2001,
allowed onbudget surpluses to be used to offset tax reductions or spending increases within the
ten-year budget window. Because the estimated surpluses were sufficient to cover the
estimated costs of the tax cuts, the 2001 Act did not violate the Senate's paygo rule. A
violation would have been subject to a point of order which could have been waived
only by a three-fifths supermajority. See H.R. REP. No. 107-60, at 91-93 (2001);
Robert Keith & Bill Heniff Jr., PAYGO Rules for Budget Enforcement in the House
and Senate 1-5 (Cong. Res. Serv., Report No. RL32835, 2005). The tax cuts were also
subject to a separate statutory paygo rule which was enforceable, at least in theory, by
sequestration; however, the remedy of sequestration could be avoided by various
techniques including directed scorekeeping. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 15, at
1050; Keith & Heniff, supra, at 2-3; Robert Keith, Techniques for Preventing a Budget
Sequester 7-14 (Cong. Res. Serv., Report No. RL31155, 2002).
36 The drop in revenue costs for the estate tax cuts was proportionately
greater
than for any of the major income tax cuts. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra
note 20, at 59 (showing cost of tax cuts in administration's proposals); STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 18, at 1-3 (showing cost of tax cuts in 2001 Act).
37Unlike the Senate paygo rule, which has been renegotiated and amended on a
fairly regular basis, the Byrd rule has remained in place without significant changes
since 1990. See Keith, supra note 21, at 2-4. At several points McCaffery and Cohen
refer to the Byrd rule as having expired in 2002. See McCaffery & Cohen, supra note
29, at 1207, 1215-16 & n.186. They appear to conflate the Byrd rule with the Senate
paygo rule which did in fact expire on September 30, 2002 and was restored and
extended by unanimous consent on October 16,-2002. See Keith & Heniff, supra note
35, at 4.
38See Burke & McCouch, supra note 15, at 1052-53; Evans, supra note 15, at
408; Keith, supra note 21, at 2; Donald B. Tobin, Less is More: A Move Toward Sanity
in the Budget Process, 16 ST. LouIs U. PUB. L. REV. 115, 132 (1996) ("The general
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provided significant political leverage to opponents of the 2001 tax

cuts. The gimmicks in the 2001 Act demonstrate the inherent
shortcomings of budget rules, particularly in light of the disintegration
of political consensus on the goal of deficit control.3 9
At a more basic level, the analysis offered by McCaffery and

Cohen seems unduly narrow. In seeking to explain the dynamics of
estate tax repeal exclusively in terms of rent extraction, they miss
other relevant dimensions of the process: potentially conflicting
interests of individual politicians, the influence of political parties,
tradeoffs between alternative tax and spending priorities, concerns
about revenue costs and budget deficits, institutional tensions within
and between the legislative and executive branches, and the important
role of anti-tax ideology. The 2001 Act and its aftermath can plausibly

be explained not primarily as a deliberate strategy by individual
politicians to extract campaign contributions but rather as a legislative
stalemate

between

supporters

and

opponents

of

the

Bush

administration's tax-cutting agenda. Members of both factions may
have been motivated in varying degrees by party loyalty, ideology,

political ambition, and self-interest. To the extent they considered
competing policy goals, the administration's supporters presumably
placed more emphasis on economic stimulus and capital formation
while opponents were more concerned with distributional equity and
long-term

revenue costs. While

abolitionists

naturally

aligned

view in the Senate was that deficit reduction was so important that it warranted fasttrack consideration. However, Senators wanted to make sure that this privileged
procedure was applied only to measures which would decrease the deficit."). As a
result of the Byrd rule, estate tax repeal can be made permanent only with sixty votes
in the Senate. However, only fifty-one votes in the Senate would be required to
extend repeal on a year-to-year basis. See Graetz & Shapiro, supra note 6, at 191;
Rudolph G. Penner & C. Eugene Steuerle, Budget Rules, 57 NAT'L TAX J. 547, 556
(2004) (noting that the long-run budget effect is similar to a permanent tax cut but
introduces "considerable uncertainty" into the tax system). Although a series of
annual extensions would circumvent the Byrd rule, it would also force lawmakers to
weigh estate tax repeal against other (possibly more pressing) expiring tax cuts. See id.
at 552 (noting that reestablishing paygo rules might have "perverse effect" of giving
proponents of tax cuts for the rich leverage to demand extension of those cuts in
conjunction with extension of middle-class tax cuts).
39 During most of the 1990s the budget rules worked effectively to enforce a
political consensus on the importance of deficit reduction. However, with the
unexpected emergence of surpluses beginning in 1998, the underlying consensus
disintegrated and budget discipline eroded. From this perspective, the gimmicks in the
2001 Act and subsequent tax cuts may foreshadow a much larger fiscal crisis. See
Penner & Steuerle, supra note 38, at 547-53; id. at 556 ("It is extremely difficult to
design rules that prevent the Congress from imposing costs on future generations.").
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themselves with the anti-tax faction, they apparently lacked the

political clout to put estate tax repeal at the top of the
administration's agenda. In calculating risks and opportunities, leaders

of the anti-tax faction may have discounted the importance of the
sunset provision in the 2001 Act, believing that they would eventually
succeed in making all of the tax cuts permanent. In the years since
2001, however, as the cost of extending the tax cuts has become
clearer, the prospects for permanent estate tax repeal have receded.40

The abolitionists do not have time on their side.
IV. BETWEEN REPEAL AND REFORM

The legislative stalemate reflected in the 2001 Act has led to

increased complexity, instability, and uncertainty in the tax law. In the
near term, while the estate tax remains in place, the fallout has
already manifested itself in several ways: constantly shifting rates and
exemptions; inconsistent gift and estate tax exemptions that create
perverse disincentives for lifetime gifts; disintegration of the
longstanding system of pick-up taxes at the state level due to repeal of

the state death tax credit; and, of course, persistent uncertainty about
the likelihood of estate tax repeal in 2010 and subsequent years. The
2001 Act has thus made planning and compliance considerably more

costly and burdensome - an ironic result, in view of abolitionists'
repeated complaints about the costs and burdens imposed on
taxpayers under prior law. Unsurprisingly, however, the abolitionists

have seized on the complexity and uncertainty of current law as one
more reason to make repeal permanent.41
40

The cost of permanent repeal rises dramatically with each passing year under

a ten-year horizon that includes years after 2010, because the total cost reflects the
substitution of an additional year of foregone estate tax revenue at the end of the
moving ten-year horizon for one year of undiminished revenue at the beginning of the
horizon. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 15, at 1051.
41 Supporters of the Bush administration's tax cuts argue that "it was never
anticipated that the sunset [provisions] actually would be allowed to take effect" and
that "eliminating them promptly would promote stability and rationality in the tax
law." STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2009 BUDGET PROPOSAL 5

(Joint Comm. Print 2008); see also OFFICE OF MGMT. AND

BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE

222
(2008) (arguing that tax cuts "were not intended to be temporary"). This argument
ignores the fact that the reason for including the sunset provisions was to circumvent
the Byrd rule and allow the 2001 Act to pass with less than sixty votes in the Senate.
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra, at 2 (noting that sunset provision in
2001 Act was included "in order to comply with reconciliation procedures").
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2009: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES
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Estate tax repeal, if it actually takes effect as scheduled in 2010,
and especially if it becomes permanent as urged by President Bush, 42

has serious implications for the income tax treatment of property
passing from a decedent. Under current law, the estate tax may be
viewed as compensating - admittedly in a very rough way - for the

tax-free basis step-up for appreciated property acquired from a
decedent." Abolishing the estate tax while continuing to allow an
unlimited deathtime basis step-up would produce large revenue losses,

reinforce the tendency of most individuals to retain appreciated assets
until death, and open a "gaping loophole" in the income tax." Thus, as
a practical matter, estate tax repeal would almost certainly have to be

accompanied by a change in the deathtime basis step-up. Although
this point is plain to most policy analysts, it is routinely ignored by
anti-tax advocates, who prefer to focus narrowly on the burdens of the
estate tax and the anticipated benefits of repeal.
There are two obvious alternatives to the deathtime basis step-up:

a deathtime gains tax or carryover basis. A deathtime gains tax may
42

See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND

BUDGET,

supra note 41, at 253, 265 tbl.17-3.

President Bush's budget proposals seek to avoid scoring the revenue loss from
permanent repeal by changing the budget baseline to "[a]ssume extension of all
expiring tax provisions in the [2001 Act]." Id. at 222. See Burke & McCouch, supra
note 15, at 1052 (describing the use of sunset provision to avoid the appearance of
long-term deficits, followed by change in baseline to avoid impact of sunset provision,
as "bait-and-switch" tactic).
43 See I.R.C. § 1014(a) (providing basis generally equal to fair
market value of
property acquired from decedent). As a proxy for a deathtime gains tax, the estate tax
is both overinclusive (because it reaches fair market value, regardless of unrealized
appreciation, and often applies at higher marginal rates) and underinclusive (because
it fails to reach substantial amounts of property due to a large exemption and
unlimited marital deduction). By some estimates up to one-half of all capital gains
permanently escape income taxation due to the deathtime basis step-up. See THE
TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL 221 (Mervyn A. King & Don Fullerton eds.,
1984) (noting that "about half of gains are never realized because of the increase of
basis at death"); LEONARD E. BURMAN, THE LABYRINTH OF CAPITAL GAINS TAX
POLICY 51 (1999).
William G. Gale & Joel Slemrod, Overview, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT
1, 55 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001); see STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 110TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL
YEARS 2007-2011, at 28 (Joint Comm. Print 2007) (estimating $279.9 billion tax
TAXATION

expenditure attributable to deathtime basis step-up for fiscal years 2007-2011).
45 See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Death Without
Taxes?,

20 VA.
TAX REV. 499, 554 (2001) (discussing carryover basis and concluding that in the
absence of an estate tax a deathtime gains tax "may be preferable [to carryover basis]
in terms of distributional impact and revenue-raising capacity as well as effectiveness
in curbing deferral and ameliorating lock-in"); Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at
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be preferable to carryover basis as a matter of policy, but it has
consistently failed to gain political traction, perhaps because if
exemptions were set low enough to raise substantial revenue much of
the burden of the tax would be shifted to middle-income taxpayers
who are currently not subject to the estate tax.46 Instead, Congress
chose in 2001 to couple estate tax repeal with a modified form of
carryover basis for property passing from a decedent. The central
problems with carryover basis stem from its feeble revenue-raising
capacity and its regressive distributional effects.47 Carryover basis
inherently allows taxpayers who inherit appreciated property to defer
paying tax on the unrealized gain until they sell the property. In this
context, deferral is equivalent to a reduction in the rate of tax on
capital gains; the longer the deferral period, the lower the effective tax
rate. 48 The benefits of deferral are greatest at the top of the wealth
distribution, because the ratio of unrealized gain to asset value tends
to rise with net worth.49 In any event, the new carryover basis
Death, 46 VAND. L. REV. 361, 441 (1993) (concluding that "it is possible to design a
death gains tax that is workable, fair, and raises substantial revenue" and that "taxing
gains at death is a more attractive option than carryover basis").
46 See Burke & McCouch, supra note 45, at 515-16. By one estimate, a generic
deathtime gains tax would raise total revenue of $86.4 billion during the period 20022011 and would apply to around ten percent of decedents. See CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, BUDGET OPTIONS 421 (2001). A different study concluded that a deathtime
gains tax with modest exemptions would produce a lower tax liability than the existing
estate tax for 95 percent of decedents with a net worth of more than $1 million, while
the overall burden would be roughly similar to that of the estate tax for decedents
with a net worth of $1 million or less. See James M. Poterba & Scott Weisbenner, The
DistributionalBurden of Taxing Estates and Unrealized Capital Gains at Death, in
RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION 422, 447-48 (William G. Gale et al. eds.,
2001).
47 See Burke & McCouch, supra note 45, at 517-18. In 2001 the Congressional
Budget Office estimated that a generic carryover basis system would raise total
revenue of $52.5 billion during the period 2002-2011, slightly more than half the yield
of a deathtime gains tax. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 46, at 422 (assuming
basis equal to 50 percent of deathtime value). Revenue estimates for any carryover
basis system are sensitive to the time horizon for realization of gains, which in turn is
extremely difficult to predict.
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PERSPECTIVES ON THE OWNERSHIP OF CAPITAL
10-11 (1997) (noting that effective
tax rate, assuming 7 percent annual appreciation, would be "about one-half the
statutory rate of 28 percent if the asset was held for 30 years").
49 According to one study, unrealized capital gains represent 36 percent of the
total expected value of all estates and 56 percent of the total expected value of estates
of $10 million or more. See Poterba & Weisbenner, supra note 46, at 439, 440 tbl.10-8.
The composition of estate assets and sources of unrealized appreciation vary
ASSETS AND THE REALIZATION OF CAPITAL GAINS
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provisions will apply only to a small number of very large estates; the
2001 Act provides generous exemptions which ensure that the vast
bulk of appreciated property passing at death will continue to receive
a tax-free basis step-up. 0 Ironically, it is precisely taxpayers at the top
of the wealth distribution who may be able to defer realizing gains
indefinitely and reduce the effective tax rate to a negligible level. For
families that pass dynastic wealth intact from generation to
generation, carryover basis poses no serious threat.
The carryover basis system in the 2001 Act also raises concerns
about compliance and administration. Even in the absence of the
estate tax, executors will be required to collect and report detailed
information including adjusted basis and fair market value for
property owned at death in order to make a valid allocation of any
allowable basis increase.51 In addition, the statute gives executors
broad discretion to allocate the basis increase among estate assets but
fails to specify a default method of allocation. Executors may find
their fiduciary responsibilities under the new carryover basis system to
be at least as costly and burdensome as under the estate tax."
Moreover, because the statute provides no formal procedure for
reviewing the basis information reported by executors, there is no
assurance that beneficiaries can rely on such information in reporting
gain or loss on an eventual sale of property acquired from a decedent.
The lack of a mechanism for making a final and binding determination

significantly within and across different wealth and income categories. See id. at 439,
442.
5o The exemptions allow a basis increase for up to $1,300,000 of unrealized
appreciation in any property owned at death, as well as up to $3,000,000 of unrealized
appreciation in property passing in qualifying form to the decedent's surviving spouse.
The exemptions do not apply, however, to qualified pension plans, individual
retirement accounts, or other items of income in respect of a decedent. See I.R.C.
§ 1022(b), (c), (f); Burke & McCouch, supra note 18, at 202-12. The exemptions go
far beyond what would be needed to provide targeted relief for smaller estates. For
example, if a married decedent leaves an estate of $10 million, including $5,600,000 of
unrealized appreciation, to a surviving spouse, and the spouse subsequently leaves the
same amount to the couple's children, the spouses' combined exemptions will be
sufficient to provide a full basis step-up. See id. at 204-06.
51 See I.R.C. § 6018(c). Although the statute requires information reporting only
for estates worth more than $1,300,000 (as well as certain gifts received by the
decedent within three years before death), as a practical matter an executor must file
an information return in order to allocate any allowable basis increase regardless of
the size of the estate. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 18, at 216-20.
52 See id. at 212-23.
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of the basis of inherited property raises serious concerns about the
administrability of the carryover basis system.53
The decision in the 2001 Act to retain the gift tax as a stand-alone
tax in 2010 with a top marginal rate of 35 percent makes little sense in
terms of tax policy.54 As a measure to deter income shifting, a standalone gift tax seems cumbersome and ineffective. It perpetuates much
of the complexity of current law with weakened enforcement
mechanisms, and creates a perverse incentive for individuals to hold
appreciated property until death in order to take advantage of the
exemptions from carryover basis and obtain a limited basis step-up. In
the absence of the estate tax, it is difficult to see how a stand-alone gift
tax - or, for that matter, carryover basis - can last very long. Indeed,

both measures may be seen as subterfuges designed to mask the costs
of abolishing the estate tax.
Given the political deadlock between abolitionists and defenders
of the estate tax, it is tempting to consider alternative approaches to
taxing inherited wealth. The anti-tax message draws much of its
rhetorical force from images of severe hardships imposed by the
estate tax on virtuous, hard-working entrepreneurs; understandably,
abolitionists do not dwell on countervailing images of large inherited
fortunes squandered by undeserving beneficiaries. Arguably, the antitax message would lose some of its appeal if the debate focused on the
implications of inherited wealth from the perspective of beneficiaries
rather than transferors.55 Moreover, such a shift might come about
more readily if the transferor-centered estate tax were reconfigured as
a beneficiary-centered tax on inherited wealth.
One leading proposal along these lines is an accessions tax which
would be imposed at progressive rates on cumulative gifts and
bequests received by each individual beneficiary during his or her
lifetime.56 The main advantages of the accessions tax are that it

" See id. at 216-20.
5
See id. at 223-28.
" See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at 233-35; see also W.D. Andrews,
What's FairAbout Death Taxes?, 26 NAT'L TAX J. 465, 465-66 (1973) (suggesting that
estate tax may be viewed as "a way of getting at family wealth in excess of what goes
to meet each generation's normal requirements" and that property left at death
normally represents "a windfall to recipients").
56 See William D. Andrews, The Accessions Tax Proposal,
22 TAX L. REV. 589
(1967); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An Accessions Tax, 23 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J.
211 (1988); see also John K. McNulty, FundamentalAlternatives to Present Transfer
Tax Systems, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 85 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr.
ed., 1977).
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automatically aligns the burden of the tax with the benefit of the
transfer and unifies the tax treatment of gifts and bequests. As a
result, the accessions tax may be perceived as fairer than the estate tax
in the sense that beneficiaries who receive equal amounts of gifts and
bequests are taxed equally, without regard to the number of
transferors, the size of any transferor's estate, or amounts transferred
to others. In addition, by taxing accessions at the time of receipt, the
tax avoids some difficult valuation problems concerning transfers in
trust. 57 Nevertheless, although the accessions tax proposal has sparked
considerable interest in academic circles, it has never attracted
political support as a legislative proposal.
Alternatively, the taxation of inherited wealth could be integrated
with the income tax by including gifts and bequests in the beneficiary's
gross income.58 The attraction of the income tax approach stems from
its apparent simplicity and its implicit acknowledgment that gifts and
bequests reflect ability to pay to the same extent as realized accessions
to wealth from any other source.59 On closer examination, however,
this approach may not be so simple after all. Conceptually, it seems
clear that a beneficiary who includes a gift or bequest of appreciated

57 To prevent indefinite deferral of tax through the use of long-term trusts, it

may be appropriate to collect a withholding tax at the creation of a trust, which could
then be credited against the tax ultimately imposed on distributions to individual
beneficiaries. See Andrews, supra note 56, at 605-13. A separate and more intractable
problem arises from the widespread use of family limited partnerships and similar
entities to obtain valuation discounts for lack of marketability and lack of control. See
Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Family Limited Partnerships:Discounts,
Options, and DisappearingValue, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 649 (2004).
58 See John K. McNulty, A Transfer Tax Alternative: Inclusion Under the
Income
Tax, 4 TAX NOTES 24 (1976); Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform:
Including Gifts and Bequests in Income, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1177 (1978); see also
McNulty, supra note 56.
59 See McNulty, supra note 56, at 95-97. This approach could be implemented by
repealing the longstanding income tax exclusion for gifts and bequests. For a variation
on the income tax approach, see LILY L. BATCHELDER, TAXING PRIVILEGE MORE
EFFECTIVELY: REPLACING THE ESTATE TAX WITH AN INHERITANCE TAX (Brookings
Inst., Hamilton Project, 2007). Batchelder's proposal would tax gifts and bequests as
income to the recipient at a special rate equal to the recipient's regular marginal rate
plus 15 percent, subject to a cumulative lifetime exemption of $2,300,000 (indexed for
inflation) as well as smaller annual exclusions. To avoid hardship in certain cases
involving illiquid assets, the tax could be deferred (with interest) until the assets were
sold. Trusts with multiple taxable beneficiaries would be subject to a special
withholding tax that would eventually be credited (with interest) against the tax owed
by the beneficiary upon distribution. The proposal would also replace the deathtime
basis step-up of current law with carryover basis. See id. at 16-28.

2008]

The Empty Promiseof Estate Tax Repeal

6
property in income should take the property with a stepped-up basis. 0

Furthermore, in the absence of an estate tax, it would be difficult to
justify failing to tax the transferor on any unrealized appreciation at
the time of the transfer. 6' The net result - taxing the transferor on
unrealized appreciation and simultaneously taxing the beneficiary on
the full value of the transferred property - would almost certainly
provoke charges of unfair "double taxation," while the obvious

methods of relief - substituting carryover basis for the transferorlevel tax or allowing deferral of the beneficiary-level tax - would
erode the effective rate of tax and impair the administrability of the
income tax approach. 61 In addition, an income tax approach that fails

to impose some type of generation-skipping tax or differential rate
structure would encourage very wealthy families to establish longterm dynasty trusts.63

60 This would require a change in the treatment of property acquired
by gift

under current law. See I.R.C. § 1015. Batchelder's proposal would move in the
opposite direction and require the beneficiary to take a carryover basis in property
acquired by gift or bequest. See Batchelder, supra note 59, at 20 (rejecting deemed
realization because it "might undercut political support for taxing inherited income");
id. at 45 (asserting, without explanation, that "experience suggests that carryover
basis for bequests would be workable"). In this context, carryover basis appears
conceptually awkward and also raises significant practical problems of
implementation. See id. at 21 (suggesting basis step-up for appreciated assets worth
less than $10,000 and not held for production of income).
61 See Burke & McCouch, supra note 45, at 551-52 ("[I]ncluding
gifts and
bequests in the recipient's income tax base implies not only that the recipient would
receive the transferred property with a fair-market-value basis (reflecting the amount
included in income) but also that the transferor would realize any built-in gain at the
time of the transfer.").
62 Batchelder's proposal would allow a beneficiary to defer the tax on
inherited
illiquid assets (e.g., a closely held business or farm) to the extent the tax could not be
paid with other inherited liquid assets. See Batchelder, supra note 59, at 21-23.
Moreover, "if the heir held on to an illiquid asset for life and ultimately bequeathed it
to someone else, the associated tax would carry over to the new heir." Id. at 23. In this
situation, deferral would amount to a reduction in the effective rate of tax,
notwithstanding the accruing interest charge, because all subsequent transfers from
one beneficiary to the next during the deferral period would escape tax entirely. The
only tax that would ever be paid (when the asset was eventually sold) would be the
tax on the transfer to the initial beneficiary (plus interest).
63 Cf. Andrews, supra note 55, at 466-67 ("Transfers are the convenient
occasion
for imposing tax, but the underlying object is transmission of wealth, and a transfer
[from] a grandparent to a grandchild involves twice as much transmission as does a
transfer from parent to child.... Wealth transferred from grandparent to grandchild
is surplus in relation to two generations, not just one.").
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Perhaps, after all, incremental adjustments to the existing estate
tax represent the most realistic prospect for reform. In the current
political climate, it is difficult to imagine opponents of the estate tax
embracing any alternative system of taxing inherited wealth, even (or
perhaps especially) one that might be widely perceived as fairer and
more effective than the estate tax. 64 Looking ahead, the central task
will be to mitigate the damage done in 2001 and establish a reunified
estate and gift tax system with an indexed exemption of reasonable
size and a moderately graduated rate structure. 65
V. CONCLUSION

The terms of the debate over the estate tax have been framed
largely by abolitionists who have relentlessly propounded a powerful
anti-tax message that portrays the estate tax as unambiguously
harmful and threatening to ordinary families and small businesses.
The attack on the estate tax is inextricably linked to a larger agenda of
eliminating taxes on capital and capital income and dismantling the
progressive elements of the federal tax system.66 The slogan of estate
tax repeal, while remarkably effective in mobilizing anti-tax
sentiment, makes no sense as a matter of tax policy because it
Estate tax repeal is not inherently inconsistent with the goal of
making the tax
system simpler and fairer. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Casefor Wealth
Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283, 345, 352 (1994) (advocating "progressive
consumption-without-estate tax" with separate, higher rates on consumption from
inherited wealth); Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understandingof Tax, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 807, 812 (2005) (advocating "progressive postpaid consumption tax" as "the
fairest and least arbitrary of all comprehensive tax systems").- Most advocates of
estate tax repeal, however, show no interest in maintaining any significant degree of
progressivity in the overall tax system.
65 Any proposal to set the top marginal estate tax rate equal to the
prevailing
income tax rate for capital gains while retaining large exemptions would be equivalent
for the vast majority of taxpayers to outright repeal of the estate tax. For the very
rich, the effect would be equivalent to a deathtime gains tax with a reduced effective
rate. By one estimate, the total revenue cost for fiscal years 2008-2012 of extending
the estate tax cuts in the 2001 Act would be $102.4 billion, while the cost of restoring
the estate tax in 2010 with a $5 million exemption (indexed for inflation) and a flat
rate equal to the top capital gains rate would be $74.8 billion, and the cost of restoring
the estate tax with a $3.5 million exemption (indexed for inflation) and a flat 45
percent rate would be $30 billion. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET OPTIONS 31315 (2007).
66 See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at 4 ("Estate
tax repeal is one
important strand of a looming effort to strip from our nation's tax system the very
idea that those who have more should shoulder a larger share of the tax burden."); id.
at 266-78 (linking estate tax repeal to broader antitax agenda).
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downplays revenue costs, distributional effects, administrative
concerns, and consequences for the rest of the tax system. The 2001
Act illustrates the gap between the abolitionists' simplistic anti-tax
agenda and the complex reality of tradeoffs among competing tax and
spending priorities. The estate tax cuts enacted in 2001 imply large
revenue losses as well as a shift in tax burdens from the very rich to
the middle class and from current taxpayers to future taxpayers. This
appears to be a step in precisely the wrong direction, given growing
inequalities of income and wealth and a looming fiscal gap.
As a practical matter, it seems increasingly unlikely that the estate
tax will be permanently repealed. The protracted phase-out period
and the sunset provision in the 2001 Act have exacerbated uncertainty
and destabilized the tax system while encouraging strategic behavior
by lawmakers and interest groups. In the ensuing game of
brinkmanship, if the abolitionists fail to make repeal permanent, they
will undoubtedly attempt to characterize the restoration of the estate
tax as a tax increase. Nevertheless, if Congress is finally forced to
confront the real implications of estate tax repeal and roll back some
of the Bush administration's tax cuts, the abolitionists may find that
their reach exceeds their grasp.

